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THE SEARCH FOR GREATER ACCOUNTABILITY
OF NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS:
RECENT LEGAL DEVELOPMENTS AND
PROPOSALS FOR CHANGE
Marion R. Fremont-Smith*
INTRODUCTION

Charity law is in a state of flux: The basic rules, many with roots in
earliest common law, are being reconsidered and revised by legislators,
scholars, and practitioners. Among these are rules prohibiting donors from
bringing legal suits to enforce the terms of their gifts; laws limiting the
ability of donors to agree with charitable donees to modify the terms of
their gifts; the doctrines of cy pres and deviation under which charitable
purposes and methods for administering them may be altered due to
changed circumstances; the statutory provisions imposing on all directors of
charitable corporations a duty to participate in the affairs of the corporation;
and the rules setting forth the extent to which charitable fiduciaries can be
held liable for breach of their duties of loyalty and care.
In the realm of enforcement of these rules, Congress has been asked to
consider measures to enhance the existing regulatory scheme which relies
on the Internal Revenue Code to define the duties and obligations of
charitable fiduciaries and looks to the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) as the
agency to enforce these obligations. At the same time, some scholars are
suggesting that all regulation be removed from the IRS or that some of its
powers be transferred to an agency more suited to regulate tax-exempt
entities, as the IRS's principal focus is tax collection.
This essay contains a survey of the most recently adopted changes and
pending proposals for change in both state and federal law applicable to
nonprofit charitable organizations.
It focuses on developments in
substantive state laws expanding the rights of donors and the doctrines of cy
pres and deviation. It also describes August 2006 amendments to the
Internal Revenue Code and other proposals by the staff of the Senate
* Adjunct Lecturer in Public Policy, Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University. I
wish to thank Emmeline Barton and Laura Damerville, Harvard Law School Class of 2007,
for their invaluable research assistance. Portions of this essay were presented at the New
York University School of Law Conference Grasping the Nettle: Respecting Donor Intent
and Avoiding the Dead Hand, on October 27, 2005, and at the Harvard University Hauser
Center for Nonprofit Organizations and Harvard Law School Conference Toward a Public
Policy Strategyfor Nonprofit Governance and Accountability, on October 3, 2006.
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Finance Committee and by the Joint Committee on Taxation since 2004 that
remain under consideration in Congress, together with responses to them
from the nonprofit community and interested scholars and practitioners. '
Current law grants privileges to charitable nonprofit organizations; of
these, tax exemption is foremost, but they also include unlimited life, the
ability to accumulate income, and protection to fiduciaries from suits by
unhappy or unruly donors, as well as by members of the general public.
Substantive laws in the individual states define charitable purposes, govern
the creation and dissolution of charities, and set forth the duties and powers
of their fiduciaries. The provisions of the Internal Revenue Code mirror
these state rules-some impose more stringent limitations while others are
more lenient.
Enforcement of state laws is the unique province of the attorneys general
who have traditionally had exclusive jurisdiction to bring wrongdoing to the
attention of state courts, with the courts empowered to apply a wide range
of sanctions to assure compliance with the rules and remedy violations. In
contrast, as noted, enforcement of the federal laws is in the hands of the
IRS, which has the power to revoke exemption, and apply financial
sanctions in the form of excise taxes, as well as unique standing to pursue
actions in the federal courts, including the U.S. Tax Court and the U.S.
Court of Federal Claims.
Thus, one must consider two levels of
governments-each with differing interests and goals-and one must also
consider the advantages of uniformity, lest compliance becomes an
impossible burden or disparate rules create such confusion that enforcement
becomes near impossible. 2
I. STATE LAW: SIGNIFICANT DEVELOPMENTS AND PROPOSALS

State laws governing the organization and operation of charitable
nonprofit organizations are found in the statutes enabling creation of
charitable corporations and trusts. These include statutes and case law that
define accepted charitable purposes for which they may be created; describe
the powers, duties, and liabilities of fiduciaries in regard to the
administration of these entities; and govern the dissolution or merger of
charitable organizations. In all instances, these laws direct the application
of their assets to other charitable entities or when circumstances require or

1. The term "charities" as used herein refers to organizations described in § 501(c)(3)
of the Internal Revenue Code that are eligible to receive contributions that are deductible by
their donors for federal tax purposes. In some instances it also includes organizations
exempt from tax by virtue of being described in Internal Revenue Code § 501(c)(4), many of
which are considered charities under state law. The remaining universe of nonprofit
organizations described in § 501 are not subject to the constraints under either federal or
state law described herein, nor are they the focus of current interest in reform.
2. See generally Marion R. Fremont-Smith,

Governing Nonprofit Organizations:

Federal and State Law and Regulation (2004) (providing detailed descriptions of the history
of charity, existing laws, and enforcement regimes referred to herein together with proposals
for reform).

2007]

NONPROFITACCOUNTABILITY

permit modification of their purposes or methods of administration so that
they may continue to provide contemporaneous benefit to the general
public.
The major recent changes in state laws that have been enacted or are
being considered involve statutes governing creation and administration of
charities; rights of donors, the doctrines of cy pres and deviation that the
courts apply when there are changed circumstance, and the duties and
extent of liabilities of trustees and directors in cases of breach. There has
been far less interest in increasing regulation of charities in the states,
although proposals to enhance the power of the attorney general have been
considered in a few states together with provisions that would impose limits
on charities similar to those in the Sarbanes-Oxley Act applicable to
publicly traded companies.
A. The Proponentsof Change
The leading proponents of change in state charity laws, in addition to
individual legislators and members of the executive branch, notably the
attorneys general, include the American Law Institute (ALI), the National
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, and the American
Bar Association (ABA) acting through committees of its various sections.
Since 1990, each of these groups has been considering major reforms of
certain aspects of the laws governing charities. A number of their proposals
have been adopted in various states, while others are still being refined. In
addition, the attorneys general in California, Massachusetts, New York, and
Texas have introduced bills designed to improve regulation. As of January
1, 2007, only the California bill had been adopted.
The first of the recent changes in state laws governing the administration
of charities was the adoption in 1992 of a new "Prudent Investor Rule" as
part of the Restatement (Third) of Trusts section 227. 3 The Prudent
Investor Rule incorporated the principles of modern investment theory and
made obsolete old concepts of trust investment that in many jurisdictions
severely restricted the ability of fiduciaries to make wise investments. The
rule is intended to apply to charitable and private trusts as well as charitable
corporations and is now in force in thirty-six states. 4 Additional changes to
the Restatement (Third) of Trusts, adopted in 2001 and 2003, enlarged the
definitions of specific categories of charitable purposes in earlier versions
of the Restatement and liberalized the doctrine of cy pres.
In 2000, the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State
Laws adopted the Uniform Trust Code (UTC), subsequently amending it in
2001 and 2003. As of January 1, 2007, the UTC had been adopted in

3. Restatement (Third) of Trusts: Prudent Investor Rule § 227 (1992).
4. See Unif. Prudent Investor Act, 7B U.L.A. 15 (2006); see also Cornell Univ. Law
2003),
(Apr.
Locator
Laws
and
Financial
Business
Uniform
Sch.,
http://www.law.cornell.edu/uniform/vol7.html#pruin (listing state statutes).
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nineteen states. 5 Section 413 contains a new formulation of the doctrine of
cy pres that follows the Restatement (Third), 6 but, in a radical change from
prior law, section 405 grants standing to donors to enforce the terms of their
7
charitable gifts.
In 2002, the commissioners constituted a study committee to consider
amendments to the Uniform Management of Institutional Funds Act
(UMIFA), first promulgated in 1972, and as of January 1, 2007, in force in
forty-eight states. 8 This Act governs investment and management of
endowment and other restricted funds and was not in conformity with the
principles in the Modem Prudent Investor Act. Proposed revisions were
considered by the commissioners at their annual meetings in 2004 and
2005, and they were adopted in July 2006. As of 2007, the revised Act had
been introduced in twenty-one states and enacted in thirteen. 9 Revisions to
the original act dealing with donor intent, donors' powers, and cy pres are
described below.
The major recent impetus for change in nonprofit law is the inauguration
by the ALI in 2001 of a project to define Principles of Nonprofit Law that
will parallel its Principles of Corporate Governance for business
corporations adopted in 1992. Following its established procedures, the
ALI formed a committee of advisors and a members consultative group and
appointed Professor Evelyn Brody of Chicago-Kent School of Law as
reporter. Preliminary drafts were published in subsequent years, and the
membership reviewed provisions relating to governance. In September, the
ALI Council reviewed a revised draft that reflected the May discussions. 10
These provisions are described below.
In February 2006, the Task Force to Revise the Model Nonprofit
Corporation Act, constituted by the Committee on Nonprofit Corporations
of the Section on Business Law of the ABA, circulated an exposure draft of
the third edition of the Proposed Model Nonprofit Corporation Act. The
Model Nonprofit Corporation Act was first published in 1952. It was
subsequently amended in 1987 and is referred to as the Revised Model
Nonprofit Corporation Act. "1

5. See Nat'l Conference of Comm'rs on Unif. State Laws, A Few Facts About the
Uniform Trust Code, http://www.nccusl.org/update/uniformact-factsheets/uniformacts-fsutc2000.asp (last visited Sept. 28, 2007).
6. Unif. Trust Code § 413 cmt. (amended 2005), 7C U.L.A. 509.
7. Id. § 405 cmt.
8. Unif Mgmt. of Inst. Funds Act, 7A pt. 3 U.L.A. 11 (2006).

9. See Nat'l Conference of Comm'rs on Unif. State Laws, A Few Facts About the
Uniform
Prudent
Management
of
Institutional
Funds
Act,
http://www.nccusl.org/nccusl/uniformact-factsheets/uniformacts-fs-upmifa.asp (last visited
Sept. 28, 2007).
10. Principles of the Law of Nonprofit Orgs. (Council Draft No. 4, 2006); see Garry W.
Jenkins, Incorporation Choice, Uniformity, and the Reform of Nonprofit State Law, 41 Ga.
L. Rev. 1113, 1139-41 (2007).
11. Revised Model Nonprofit Corp. Act (RMNCA) (1987).
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In the summer of 2006, the Commissioners on Uniform State Laws were
asked to consider revisions to the Uniform Supervision of Trustees for
Charitable Purposes Act, adopted in 1954.12 This Act, which mandated
registration and annual reporting by charities to the attorney general and
enhanced his regulatory powers, formed the basis for statutes now in effect,
but with major substantive changes, in California, Illinois, Michigan, New
York, and Oregon. 1 3 There has been little interest in its adoption by other
states since the mid-1960s, and proponents of revision argued that it should
be revised to reflect changes required since its adoption or whether it should
be repealed.
B. Proposalsto Modify Laws Relating to Governance
1. Mandating Audits and Audit Committees
In the wake of enactment by Congress in 2002 of the Sarbanes-Oxley
Act, which imposed new obligations on publicly traded business
corporations, 14 a number of states considered extending some of its
provisions to charities, most notably those mandating financial audits, audit
committees comprised of independent directors, and certification of
financial reports by chief executive officers and chief financial officers.
Although there appeared to be general interest in the initiative, only
California adopted the proposed changes. This California act, adopted in
2004, added an audit requirement for charities with gross receipts of $2
million or more and mandated that they create audit committees. 15 The
original bill submitted by the attorney general had a $1 million threshold,
16
but it was raised after protest from some parts of the nonprofit sector.
In 2004, New York Attorney General Eliot Spitzer submitted a number
of bills to the legislature designed to clarify his enforcement powers and
"help prevent financial frauds from occurring within not-for-profit
corporations." 17 In their original form, audits and audit committees would
have been mandatory for charities with annual revenue and support of $1
million or more. 18 This provision was subsequently modified to encourage,
12. Unif. Supervision of Trs. for Charitable Purposes Act, 7C U.L.A. 350 (2006).
13. See Fremont-Smith, supra note 2, at 311-17.
14. See generally Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745
(codified in scattered sections of 11, 15, 18, 28, 29 USC).
15. Nonprofit Integrity Act of 2004, Cal. Gov't Code § 12586 (West 2004).
16. See Cal. Assembly Comm. on Judiciary, S.B. 1262 Bill Analysis (2004),
http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/pub/03-04/bill/sen/sb_1251 -

1300/sb_1262 cfa 20040621_122508_asmcomm.html; Cal. Senate Judiciary Comm., S.B.
1262
Bill Analysis
(2004), http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/pub/03-04/bill/sen/sb_12511300/sb_1262 cfa 20040421_152826_sen comm.html.
17. Eliot Spitzer, Attorney General's Legislative Program Bill No. 68-05 (n.d.),
available at http://www.oag.state.ny.us/charities/charpdf/ag68-05memo.pdf; see also N.Y.
Legislative Bill Drafting Comm'n, Program Bill No. 68-05 (2005), available at
http://www.oag.state.ny.us/charities/charpdf/ag68-05.pdf.
18. S.B. 4836-B(g)(1), 226th Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2003).
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but not require, boards to designate audit committees, while specifying the
committee's duties if one were to be established, mandating that the
members be independent and prohibiting self-dealing. 19 However, only one
of the bills submitted by the attorney general was passed in 2006: it
clarified procedures for dissolution of charities. 20 A bill introduced in
Texas in 2005 was similar to the New York proposal, requiring audits for
corporations with gross revenues of $250,000 or more. 2 1 In January 2007, a
bill was introduced in the Hawaii legislature that was similar in some
respects to the California act, requiring audits and audit committees for
nonprofit corporations with annual receipts of $1 million or more, and
22
including extensive provisions relating to whistle-blowers.
As of January 1, 2007, California, Massachusetts, and New Hampshire
were the only states that required audits for charities. In Massachusetts and
23
New Hampshire the only exemption is for religious organizations.
California exempts religious organizations, 24 cemetery corporations,
educational institutions, and health-care agencies.
Charities that solicit funds from the general public have been regulated
for more than thirty years. Today, thirty-nine states actively regulate fundraising, although the statutes contain myriad exemptions for certain
categories of charities, notably religious organizations, educational
institutions, and health-care agencies. 2 5 Nineteen of these contain an audit
26
requirement.
In almost all of the jurisdictions that require corporations to have audit
committees, an indirect concomitant is that there be independent directors
to serve thereon. California, Maine, New Hampshire, North Dakota, and
Vermont require that a majority of the directors of charitable corporations
be independent. 27 However, in all of these except New Hampshire,
independence is defined in terms of compensation, while in New
Hampshire the limitation, which does not apply to private foundations,
28
defines independence in terms of family affiliation.

19. N.Y.
Att'y
Gen.'s
Legis.
Prog.
B.
No.
68-05,
available at
http://www.oag.state.ny.us/charities/char pdf/ag68-05 .pdf.
20. N.Y. Not-for-Profit Corp. Law § 1002 (Consol. 2006).
21. S.B. 1215, 79th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Tex. 2005).
22. S.B. 73, 24th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Haw. 2007).
23. Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 12, § 8F (2006); N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 7:19 (2006).
24. Cal. Gov't Code § 12586 (West 2004).
25. See Fremont-Smith, supra note 2, at 55, 476-95.
26. See Cal. Assembly Comm. on Judiciary, supra note 16; Cal. Senate Judiciary
Comm., supra note 16; see also Marion Fremont-Smith, Summary Charts: State Nonprofit
Corporation Act Requirements and Audit Requirements for Charitable Organizations (2007),
available
at
http://www.ksg.harvard.edu/hauser/PDFXLS/MFSSummary-Charts.pdf.
27. Cal. Corp. Code § 5227 (West 2006); Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 13-B, § 713A (2006);
N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 7:19-a (2006); N.D. Cent. Code § 10-33-27 (2006); Vt. Stat. Ann. tit.
lIB, § 8.13 (2006).
28. N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 7:19-a (2006).
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2. Mandating Board Size and Committee Structure
The thrust of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act and state laws with similar
provisions is to increase accountability of directors. In direct contrast, the
proposed revisions to the Model Nonprofit Corporation Act would
eliminate provisions in the existing Model Act designed to protect assets
upon the dissolution of charities, permit broader delegation of directors'
duties, and greatly narrow the extent to which fiduciaries could be held
liable for violations of the duties of care and loyalty, permitting nonprofit
corporations in effect to grant to their directors what would amount to
virtually complete immunity from suit.
The current version of the Model Nonprofit Corporation Act is based on
the California Nonprofit Corporation Act which divides nonprofits into
three categories: public benefit (charities), mutual benefit, and religious
corporations (under substantive law, also charities) with provisions relating
to organization, termination, and duties of fiduciaries suited to their
differences. 29 The impetus for the proposed revision was to make it follow
more closely the 2002 revisions to the ABA Model Business Corporation
Act.30 The separate categories of nonprofit corporations are deleted in the
proposed revision, as are provisions relating to the enforcement powers of
the attorney general.
One of the major current issues in regard to governance of nonprofit
organizations is the degree to which directors can be assigned less than full
responsibility for the affairs of the corporation. The proposed new Model
Nonprofit Corporation Act provides that some, but less than all, of the
powers, authority, or functions of the board may be vested in a "designated
body," thereby relieving certain directors from their duties and liabilities
with respect to those powers, authority, or functions. 3 1 Some commentators
have suggested amending enabling statutes to grant authority to different
classes of board members-those with full responsibility for oversight, and
others with specific functions such as fund-raising, or with no specific
other than lending their name and prestige to the
duties or responsibilities
32
organization.
The ALl Principles of Nonprofit Law Discussion Draft criticized the
concept of "designated bodies," considering as better policy the current
legal view that all board members should have the same responsibility for
governance. 33 It suggested that it was possible to find alternative ways to
29. See Fremont-Smith, supra note 2, at 52.
30. See generally Proposed Model Nonprofit Corp. Act, Third Ed., source notes
(Exposure

Draft

2006),

available

at

http://meetings.abanet.org/webupload/comfmupload/CL580000/sitesofinterest-files/MNCAe
xposuredraft.doc.

31. Id. § 8.12(c).
32. See, e.g., Michael Klausner & Jonathan Small, Failingto Govern? The Disconnect
Between Theory and Reality in Nonprofit Boards, and How to Fix It, Stan. Soc. Innovation
Rev., Spring 2005, at 42.
33. Principles of the Law of Nonprofit Orgs. § 320 cmt. b(2) (Discussion Draft 2006).
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recruit supporters to provide financial and other aid but who
did not want to
34
make the commitment required for full board governance.
The Discussion Draft also addressed the question of the size of a board,
recommending that three unrelated individuals would be a necessary
minimum in order to protect the public interest. 35 Under current law,
36
fourteen states permit one director, and the others specify three or more.
None set a maximum number of directors, although some commentators
consider fifteen as optimal for for-profit corporations. 37 As noted below,
the Senate Finance Committee staff proposed a limit of fifteen as a best
practice, compliance with which would be required as a condition of
certification for tax exemption. 3 8 The charity governance bill submitted by
the New York attorney general in 2006 did not contain a limit on size;
rather it recommended that charities "with very large boards of directors
(i.e., more than 25 members) should establish an executive committee. ' '39
3. Liability Shields for Directors and Officers
On the issue of liability of board members for breaches of the duties of
loyalty and care, the ALI Draft Principles propound a more restrictive rule
than that contained in the proposed ABA Model Act. For example, section
370 prohibits the application of a monetary shield when there is violation
not only of the duty of loyalty but also of the duty of care if bad faith was
also involved. 40 In contrast, the proposed ABA Model Act follows the
provisions of the Model Business Corporation Act excepting from the
protection of a shield only a financial benefit to which a director is not
entitled, an intentional infliction of harm on the corporation, making
41
improper distributions, or an intentional violation of criminal law.
C. Expanding the Legal Definition of CharitablePurposes
Charitable purposes are found in the earliest cases in the common law
and were first codified in the 1601 Statute of Charitable Uses. 42 In fact, the
current definition of charitable purposes remains strikingly similar to the
examples in that formulation. In the United States, the definitions can be

34. See id.

35. Id. cmt. g(3).
36. See Fremont-Smith, supra note 26.
37. Commentators offered their comments on tax-exempt reform proposals in a
roundtable discussion held July 22, 2004. See S.Finance Comm., Papers for Charitable
Roundtable, http://finance.senate.gov/sitepages/round.htm (last visited Oct. 6, 2007).

38. Staff of S.Fin. Comm., Staff Discussion Draft, 108th Cong. 13 (2004), available at
http://www.senate.gov/-finance/hearings/testimony/2004test/062204stfdis.pdf.
39. Spitzer, supra note 17 (summarizing New York Attorney General's Legislative
Program Bill No. 68-05).
40. Principles of the Law of Nonprofit Orgs. § 370 (Discussion Draft 2006).
41. Revised Model Nonprofit Corp. Act § 8.30(d) (1987) (shield); id. § 2.02(b)(5)

(exception).
42. Statute of Charitable Uses, 1601, 43 Eliz., c. 4 (Eng.).
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found in early court decisions. 4 3 They have always been phrased in general
terms, permitting expansion to reflect the changing needs of society. 44 The
Restatement (Second) of Trusts, adopted in 1959, summarized the then
current law by listing five specific categories of charitable purposes: relief
of poverty, advancement of knowledge or education, advancement of
religion, promotion of health and governmental or municipal purposes, and
"[o]ther purposes .. .which are beneficial to the community.

'45

It then

stated, "A purpose is charitable if its accomplishment is of such social
interest to the community as to justify permitting property to be devoted to
46
the purpose in perpetuity."
Section 28 of the 2001 revisions to the Restatement of Trusts added to
this sentence the phrase "and to justify the various other special privileges
that are typically allowed to charitable trusts." 47 This addition was in
reference to relaxation of the rules against perpetual existence and
accumulations of income, as well as leniency in matters of interpretation.
Each of the Restatements also emphasized that there is no fixed standard to
determine what purposes are of such social interest to the community as to
justify treating them as charitable: the interests of the community vary with
48
time and place.
Legal recognition of the changing interest of the community and lenience
in matters of interpretation of the definition of charity were demonstrated in
the latter half of the twentieth century in cases challenging charities that
restricted the class of beneficiaries on the basis of national origin, race,
religion, gender, sexual preference, age, group, political affiliation, or other
characteristics or background. 49 As the law has evolved, the courts have
held that restrictions that involve state action or invidious discrimination are
invalid.50 In general, courts rarely have found that state action is involved
in the operation of charities, but have found invidious discrimination in the
case of racial and some gender limitations, while upholding religious
5
restrictions.
The UTC and the ALI Principles of Nonprofit Law contain phraseology
that is essentially identical to that in the Restatement (Third) of Trusts,
while the Treasury Regulations defining charitable purposes refer to the
English Statute of Elizabeth and formulations of the definition under state
law.5 2 In general, the tendency continues to be one of expansion and
43. See Fremont-Smith, supra note 2, at 118-21.
44. See id.

45. Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 368 cmt. a (1959).
46. Id. cmt. b.
47. Restatement (Third) of Trusts § 28 cmt. a (2003).
48. Restatement (Third) of Trusts § 28 cmt. a (2003); Restatement (Second) of Trusts §
368 cmt. b (1959).
49. See Fremont-Smith, supra note 2, at 122.
50. See id. at 117-25.
51. See id.

52. See Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1 (2006); Principles of the Law of Nonprofit Orgs. §
210 (Preliminary Draft No. 3, 2005); Restatement (Third) of Trusts § 28 (2003).
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liberalization, as signified in both the Restatement (Third) of Trusts and the
ALI Principles. None of the other current proposals for modifying state
charity law involve further amendment of the definition of charitable
purposes.
On November 6, 2006, the Charities Act of 2006 was adopted in the
United Kingdom. The changes followed five years of consideration of
changes in charity law. 53 The Act contained the first general statutory
definition of "charitable purpose," although it relied on the Statute of
Charitable Uses of 1601 and case law precedents. Under the Act, a purpose
is considered charitable if it meets two criteria: (1) it must fall under one or
more descriptions or "heads" of charity set forth in the Act; and (2) it is "for
the public benefit. '54 These descriptions follow precedents, but permit
expansion in the future by permitting new charitable purposes to be
recognized. The public benefit requirement is new. Under preexisting law,
there was a presumption that the relief of poverty and the advancement of
education or religion were for the public benefit, while other purposes were
not charitable without a showing of this fact. 55 Under the new statute, the
presumption was abolished and the Charity Commission was directed to
publish guidance as to the scope of the requirement. This change mirrors
suggestions for amendment of the definition of "charity" in the Internal
Revenue Code suggested by some congresspersons who favor adoption of a
similar requirement in the case of health-care agencies and educational
organizations.
D. Expanding Donors' Rights to Modify the Terms of Their Gifts
Under common law, donors have no rights to change the terms of their
gifts or release restrictions they may have placed on them, unless they have
explicitly provided otherwise at the time of the gift. Section 7(a) of the
UMIFA (adopted in all jurisdictions except Alaska, Arizona, Pennsylvania,
and South Dakota), permits donors to release restrictions they have placed
on institutional funds, but affords them no right to agree to modifications or
standing to sue to enforce restrictions. 56 During the process of revising
UMIFA, the advisory committee to the commissioners reflected differing
positions. An early version included a provision permitting donors to
approve of modifications of their gifts, similar to the provision in the UTC
permitting donors to assent to terminations. 57 The draft submitted to the
commissioners in 2005 did not include this provision. However, the retitled
Uniform Prudent Management of Institutional Funds Act (UPMIFA), as
53. Charities Act, 2006, c. 50 (Eng.).

54. See id. pt. I, § 2.
55. See Explanatory Notes to Charities Act, 2006, c. 50 (Eng.) para. 25, available at
http://www.opsi.gov.uk/acts/en2006/2006en50.htm.
56. Unif. Mgmt. of Inst. Funds Act, 7A pt. 3 U.L.A. 35 (2006).
57. Susan N. Gary, Revisions to the Uniform Management of Institutional Funds Act § 6
(2004),
available
at
http://www.abanet.org/rppt/meetings-cle/spring2004/pt/UMIFA/gary.pdf.
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adopted by the Commissioners on Uniform State Laws in July 2006,
permits an institution, with the donor's written consent, to release or modify
restrictions on the management, investment, or purposes of an institutional
fund so long as it does not allow the fund to be used for a purpose other
58
than that of the charity.
Section 430(b) of the draft ALl Principles of Nonprofit Law explains that
a restriction can be released or modified according to a procedure included
in the original gift instrument, pursuant to the UMIFA provisions if they are
available under state law, or in a court proceeding (with the participation of
the donor only if he has reserved this right in the gift instrument). 59 The
draft ALI comment notes, however, that donor input may be useful,
suggesting that the charity may want to consult the donor, if living, or the
court may permit the donor to be called as a witness or admit evidence as to
60
his intent at the time of the gift.
As to the degree to which donor intent must be considered, in the
Restatement (Third) of Trusts the reporter justifies what is termed a "more
liberal application" than in the Restatement (Second), both because settlors'
"preferences are almost inevitably a matter of speculation in any event and
because it is reasonable to suppose that among relatively similar purposes
charitably inclined settlors would tend to prefer those most beneficial to
their communities. '6 1 Nonetheless, the reporter suggests that the courts
consult the donor if available, but if not, they should consider the donor's
relationships, social or religious affiliations, personal background,
'62
charitable-giving history, "and the like."

Section 8 of the Restatement (Third) of Trusts contains a rule governing
the disposition of property on failure of an express trust. 63 In those
circumstances, generally the trustees will hold the property in resulting trust
for the transferor or his successors. As to charitable gifts, comment g of
section 8 states that "unless the settlor manifested an intention to substitute
one or more other charitable purposes or a valid non-charitable purpose, or
unless the doctrine of cy pres ...

is applicable, a resulting trust normally

arises."'64 However, noting that it is rare for a settlor to forbid application
of cy pres and provide no other purpose or disposition, the comment
65
acknowledges that the cy pres doctrine will ordinarily apply.
While, as explained further below, the UTC does grant standing to
donors to bring cy pres actions, it limits their rights to retain reversionary
interests in charitable trusts. Thus, section 413(b) states that the court may
not apply cy pres if in the terms of the trust there is a provision that would

58. Unif. Prudent Mgmt. of Inst. Funds Act § 6(a), 7A pt. 3 U.L.A. 20 (Supp. 2007).
59. Principles of the Law of Nonprofit Orgs. § 430(b) (Preliminary Draft No. 3, 2005).

60. Id. § 450 cmt. c.
61.
62.
63.
64.

Restatement (Third) of Trusts § 67 cmt. d (2003) (emphasis omitted).
Id.
Id. § 8.
Id. § 8 cmt. g.

65. See id.
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result in distribution of the trust property to a non-charitable beneficiary,
but only if the donor is living at the date the reversion is to take effect or
fewer than twenty-one years have elapsed since the date the trust was
created. 66 The comment gives as the rationale for this position that when
there is a gift over on failure of an original charitable gift to non-charitable
beneficiaries, the overriding concern of the court should be to preserve the
original charitable trust, because doing so preserves the primary charitable
intent of the testator and better serves the interests of society. 6 7 Thus the
only circumstance in which a non-charitable gift in default should be upheld
is where it is completely impracticable to apply the gift to a modified
charitable use that could be demonstrated by overwhelming evidence to be
contrary to the donor's intent. The UTC provision appears to be a
compromise in that it permits reversions during the donor's life or, if
shorter, twenty-one years.
The draft ALI Principles of Nonprofit Law also recognize that failure of a
charitable gift may under certain circumstances result in return of the
property to the donor or his successors. 68 In addition, under section 425,
they provide that, if a charity has in good faith accepted a gift lawfully
made and subsequently it becomes aware of circumstances that make
retention of the gift "imprudent or undesirable," the charity may return the
gift.

69

There are a few well-publicized recent cases in which donors have
attempted to enforce the terms of their gifts by relying on a contract theory
of trusts or specific terms in their gifts, with reverter or its equivalent being
the remedy sought on the grounds of breach of contract or unjust
enrichment. 70 A comment to section 750(a) in the draft Principles contrasts
a reverter to individuals and a "gift over" to another charity specified in the
gift instrument, suggesting that in the latter case, contract theory may be
applicable and transfer of the property may be an appropriate "remedy. '' 7 1
Judicial acceptance of this approach will, of course, drastically expand the
degree of donor control, as well as change the law of standing described
below.
E. EnablingDonors to Enforce the Terms of Their Gifts
Many legal scholars have criticized restriction on donor standing, and
since 2003 there has been an increasing number of instances reported in the
press in which donors attempted to enforce the terms of restricted gifts
66. Unif.Trust Code § 413(b), 7C U.L.A. 509 (2006).
67. Id. § 413 cmt.
68. Principles of the Law of Nonprofit Orgs. § 425 (Preliminary Draft No. 3, 2005).
69. Id. § 425(b).
70. See L.B. Research and Educ. Found. v. UCLA Found., 29 Cal. Rptr. 3d 710 (Ct.
App. 2005); Smithers v. St. Luke's-Roosevelt Hosp. Ctr., 723 N.Y.S.2d 426 (App. Div.

2001).
71. Principles of the Law of Nonprofit Orgs. § 750 cmts. a-b (Preliminary Draft No. 3,
2005).
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made to corporate charities. 72 Section 405 of the UTC provides a statutory
basis for actions with respect to charitable trusts, although in some
instances such actions have been permitted under a contract theory without
aid of a statute. 73 Under the UTC, donors are empowered to sue to enforce
the terms of their charitable gifts. 74 This UTC provision is described in the
comments as a corollary to section 413, addressing the doctrine of cy
pres. 75 The provision grants to the settlor of a charitable trust the right,
among others, to maintain a proceeding to enforce the trust. 76 The
comment notes that this provision is contrary to section 391 of the 1959
Restatement (Second) of Trusts. 77 Professor Ronald Chester describes this
provision as "a concession to a contractarian view of trust law promulgated
by one of the UTC drafters, Professor John Langbein of Yale Law
78
School."
Under this approach, a trust is treated as the functional equivalent of a
third-party beneficiary contract, with the grantor considered the promisee
and the trustee considered the promisor. The terms of the trust are then
specifically enforceable by the grantor. In the case of restricted gifts to
corporate charities, this analysis applies if there is an express contract
distinct from the gift. In the 2001 New York case of Smithers v. St. Luke'sRoosevelt Hospital Center, the court did appear to give credence to this
view. 79 A similar approach was taken in the case of L.B. Research and
Education Foundationv. UCLA Foundation,decided in June 2005.80 There
were a number of instances reported in 2005 and 2006 in which donors
were attempting to enforce the terms of gifts that included agreement by the
charitable donee to acknowledge the gift by naming a fund or facility for
the donors. 8 1 A 2005 study by John K. Eason of charitable gifts with
naming conditions contains an excellent analysis of the difficulties that can
82
arise in these situations.
A proposed amendment to UMIFA granting standing to donors was
initially rejected by the UMIFA drafting committee in 2003.83 Although
72. See Fremont-Smith, supra note 2, at 341-42.
73. Unif. Trust Code § 405, 7C U.L.A. 485 (2006).
74. Id. § 405(c).

75. Id. § 405 cmt.
76. Id. § 413 cmt.
77. Id. § 405 cmt.
78. See Ronald Chester, Grantor Standing to Enforce Charitable Transfers Under
Section 405(c) of the Uniform Trust Code and Related Law: How Important Is It and How
Extensive Should It Be?, 37 Real Prop. Prob. & Tr. J. 611, 614 (2003). See generally Evelyn
Brody, From the Dead Hand to the Living Dead: The Conundrum of Charitable-Donor
Standing, 41 Ga. L. Rev. 1183 (2007).
79. See Smithers v. St. Luke's-Roosevelt Hosp. Ctr., 723 N.Y.S.2d 426 (App. Div.
2001).

80. See L.B. Research & Educ. Found. v. UCLA Found., 29 Cal. Rptr. 3d 710 (Ct. App.
2005).
81. See generally John K. Eason, Private Motive and Perpetual Conditions in
CharitableNaming Gifts: When Good Names Go Bad, 38 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 375 (2005).
82. See id.
83. See supra note 57.
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support for its inclusion was voiced at the 2005 meeting of the
commissioners, the final
version, UPMIFA, adopted in 2006, does not
84
include the UTC rule.
In 2005, Delaware enacted a statute granting a settlor of a charitable trust
the right to maintain an action to enforce the trust and to designate persons
born or unborn to succeed to his rights. 85 This statute goes further than the
UTC by permitting the donor to name successors.
The primary argument in favor of modifying the common law limits on
donors' rights is that in the majority of the states the attorney general is not
fulfilling his duty to protect charitable assets, and that this failure is unlikely
to change given the shortage of funds available in most states for the office
of the attorney general. The donor is considered the most appropriate
person to fill the gap. As noted it is likely that the UTC will be widely
adopted within the near future, and thus one can expect to see the common
law doctrine of limited standing eroded at least in regard to charitable trusts.
F. Liberalizingthe Doctrinesof Cy Pres and Deviation
The cy pres doctrine has been a part of the common law of charities since
the Middle Ages. Under this doctrine, if the terms of a charitable gift are no
longer capable of being carried out as originally designated, the courts may
modify the gift to assure its continued utility to society. Until the start of
the twentieth century, courts construed the cy pres doctrine narrowly by
requiring demonstration that the donor had a general charitable intent before
applying the doctrine and, in its application, that new purposes have a close
proximity to the original ones. 86 Liberalization started to appear at the start
of the twentieth century as some judges looked at the broad purposes of a
gift and expressed more concern for the needs of society than the narrow
wishes of donors. 87 The Restatement (Second) of Trusts, adopted in 1959,
recognized this expansion of the traditional standards by providing in
section 399 that it was permissible for the court to order application of the
property "to some charitable purpose which falls within the general
88
charitable intention of the settlor."
Section 67 of the Restatement (Third) of Trusts signaled further
liberalization of the cy pres doctrine, adding "wastefulness" to the
conditions under which the doctrine could be applied, namely where the
purpose of the gift has become "unlawful, impossible, or impracticable" to
achieve. 89 An alternative purpose is one that "reasonably approximates the
designated purpose." 90 The comment noted that the term "wasteful" is
intended to mean more than inefficient but less than destructive or ultra
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.

Unif. Prudent Mgmt. of Inst. Funds Act § 6, 7A pt. 3 U.L.A. 20 (Supp. 2007).
75 Del. Laws 97 § 3 (2005) (amending Del. Code Ann. tit. 12, § 3303 (2001)).
See Fremont-Smith, supra note 2, at 174-82.
See id.
Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 399 (1959).
Restatement (Third) of Trusts § 67 (2003).

90. Id.
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vires and that a purpose is wasteful only if circumstances suggest that the
donor would not have imposed the contested restriction had he known of
the unanticipated circumstances. 9 1
This formulation of the cy pres doctrine was incorporated in section 413
of the UTC and adopted by the Commissioners on Uniform State Laws in
2003. Paragraph (a) of section 413 of the UTC provides that if a charitable
purpose
becomes unlawful, impracticable, impossible to achieve, or wasteful:
(1) the trust does not fail, in whole or in part;
(2) the trust property does not revert to the settlor or the settlor's
successors in interest; and
(3) the court may apply cy pres to modify or terminate the trust by
directing that the trust property be applied or distributed, in whole
or in
part, in a manner consistent with the settlor's charitable purposes. 92
The Comments make it clear that this section is intended to "codify] the
court's inherent authority to apply cy pres '' 93 to modify an administrative or
dispositive term, thereby removing a distinction that was made in the
common law and that in almost every state between the doctrine of cy pres
and a more liberal doctrine called "deviation," which applied when a
proposed modification was not to the purposes of the gift as is the case with
cy pres, but rather to the methods prescribed by the donor for its
administration. 94 It noted that the new formulation was similar to the rule
in section 67 of Tentative Draft No. 3 of the Restatement (Third) of Trusts
(the final version not yet having been adopted by the ALI), by presuming a
general charitable intent. 95 Finally, the comment makes clear that the
doctrine applies not only to trusts, but also to other types of charitable
dispositions, including those to charitable corporations. 96 Although it does
not control dispositions made in non-trust form, the comment recognizes
that courts often refer to the principles governing charitable trusts, which
97
would include the UTC.
Paragraph (b) of section 405 of the UTC is a corollary to section 413 of
the UTC. Paragraph (a) of this section contains a definition of charitable
purposes that restates what is described in the comment as "well-established
categories of charitable purposes" found in Restatement (Second) of Trusts,
and the then-Tentative Draft Restatement (Third) of Trusts. 98 Subsection
(b) then provides that "[i]f the terms of a charitable trust do not indicate a
91.
92.
93.
94.

Id. § 67 cmt. c.
Unif. Trust Code § 413(a), 7C U.L.A. 509 (2006).
Id. § 413 cmt.
Id.

95.
96.
97.
98.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. § 405 cmt.
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particular charitable purpose or beneficiary, the court may select one or
more charitable purposes or beneficiaries. The selection must be consistent
with the settlor's intention to the extent it can be ascertained." 99 The
comment contains a paraphrase of section 413(a): "[A] trust failing to state
a general charitable purpose does not fail upon failure of the particular
means specified in the terms of the trust. The court must instead apply the
trust property in a manner consistent with the settlor's charitable purposes
to the extent they can be ascertained."' 100 This final phrase does not appear
in section 413(b), raising the question of how far a court must in fact
attempt to "ascertain" the original purposes.
Section 440 of Preliminary Draft No. 3 of the ALI Principles of the Law
of Nonprofit Organizations, published in May 2005, contains a formulation
that adopts "the liberalized standards of the Restatement Third of Trusts
while providing more guidance on factors that determine the rigor or
liberality of available relief."1 0 1 Unlike the UTC, the distinction between
cy pres and deviation is retained, with greater flexibility accorded in
determining when deviation may be applied and the degree of proximity to
the donor's original intent. Recourse to donor intent is retained as a guide
in determining alternate use. If the gift instrument provides for a gift over
to an alternate beneficiary, deviation may by applied, but cy pres will not
"ordinarily" be available if transferring the gift to the taker in default will
02
carry out the donor's charitable purpose. 1
UPMIFA, adopted by the commissioners in July 2006, added three
important provisions making the doctrines of cy pres and deviation
applicable to institutional funds, defined as any "fund held by an institution
exclusively for [its] charitable purposes." 103 In addition to granting power
to donors to release or modify the restrictions described above, section 6(b)
contains a restatement of the doctrine of deviation:
[If] a restriction contained in a gift instrument regarding the management
or investment of an institutional fund .. .become[s] impracticable or

wasteful, if it impairs the management or investment of the fund, or if,
because of circumstances not anticipated by the donor, a modification of a
restriction will further the purposes of the fund . . .the court, upon

application of the institution, may modify the purpose of the fund or the
104
restriction ....

99. Id. § 405(b).
100. Id. § 405 cmt.
101. Principles of the Law of Nonprofit Orgs. § 440 cmt. a (Preliminary Draft No. 3,
2005).

102. Id. § 440(d).

103. Unif. Prudent Mgmt. of Inst. Funds Act § 2(5), 7A pt. 3 U.L.A. 6 (Supp. 2007),
availableat http://www.law.upenn.edu/bIl/ulc/umoifa/2006finalact.htm.

104. Id. § 6(b)-(c).
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This section requires advance notice to the attorney general and then states,
"To the extent practicable, any modification must be made in accordance
105
with the donor's probable intention."
Section 6(c) provides that, "[i]f a particular charitable purpose or a
restriction contained in a gift instrument on the use of an institutional fund
becomes unlawful, impracticable, impossible to achieve, or wasteful," the
court, after notice to the attorney general, "may modify the purpose... or
the restriction . . . in a manner consistent with the charitable purposes

106
expressed in the gift instrument."'
Unique to UPMIFA is a provision permitting modification of small
restricted funds without resort to the courts. If the value of a restricted fund
is less than a stated amount (the Act suggests $25,000), and if more than a
fixed number of years (the Act suggests twenty years) has passed since the
fund was established, and if the conditions under which cy pres can be
applied exist, the charity, after notice to the attorney general, may release or
modify the restriction in whole or in part. 107 There are similar provisions in
the laws of some states permitting termination of smaller trusts, again
reflecting the trend toward liberalization of the conditions under which
donor-imposed restrictions can be modified. 10 8
In direct contrast to these developments, the Massachusetts Supreme
Judicial Court in October 2006 refused to grant the request of the trustee of
a private foundation to modify the terms of the trust to permit the trust to
meet the requirements of Internal Revenue Code § 4942 and Massachusetts
law incorporating those requirements. 0 9 The trust was established in 1959
to distribute the net income for scholarships."I0 The court reasoned that to
do so would require distributions from principal and this would conflict
with the donor's expressed intent that the scholarships continue "in
perpetuity."'
The court held that "[a]llowing the requested reformation
might avoid tax liability under § 4942, but would almost certainly result in
inappropriate diminution of the trust's principal."' 12 In reaching this
conclusion, the court erroneously equated income yield with total return and
ignored the principles underlying modem prudent investment theory that
have been incorporated in Massachusetts statutes, specifically the Modem
Prudent Investor Act and UMIFA.
The court further noted that reformation of trusts had been allowed in
cases in which there was either a "scrivener's error" or a clear intent on the
part of the settlor to minimize, or avoid, adverse tax consequences, and held

105. Id. § 6(b).

106. Id. § 6(c).
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.

See id. § 6(d).
See Fremont-Smith, supra note 2,at 179.
See U.S. Trust Co. v. Att'y Gen., 854 N.E.2d 1231 (Mass. 2006).
Id. at 1232.
Id. at 1235.
Id.
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that it could not conclude that the settlor intended this outcome. 113 No
mention was made of the doctrine of deviation, which, in this instance
have afforded the appropriate
would, under Massachusetts precedents
114
rationale for permitting the reformation.
The changes in charity law adopted in England in 2006 included
provisions liberalizing the cy pres doctrine, similar to those being adopted
or under consideration in the United States. The British Charities Act of
2006 amended the traditional cy pres rule that required new purposes to be
as close as practicable to the original purposes.1 15 Under new section 14B,
the courts or the Charity Commission are required to consider three matters
when applying the doctrine: (1) the desirability of choosing new purposes
that are close to the original purposes, (2) the spirit of the gift by which the
property came to the charity, and (3) the need to ensure that the charity has
purposes which are suitable and effective in the light of current social and
economic purposes. 116 Thus, proximity to original purpose is no longer to
be considered paramount; rather, equal weight is to be given to all three
requirements.
The British Charities Act also contains provisions dealing with instances
in which property is transferred from one charity to another where the
original purposes are still useful, but the court or the commission believes
1 17
that it can be used more effectively in conjunction with other property.
In those instances, the Act permits the court or the commission to require
as
the trustees of the transferee to use the property for purposes as similar
118
held.
was
property
the
which
for
purposes
original
the
to
practicable
An important, largely undecided issue in regard to the doctrines of cy
pres and deviation is whether they are applicable to assets held by charitable
corporations, and if so to what extent. Both the Second and Third
Restatements of Trusts make it clear that the doctrines apply to all funds
devoted to charitable purposes, including gifts to and property held by
charitable corporations that are subject to specific restrictions, but not for
the general purposes of the corporate charity. 119 Some courts and
commentators take a contrary position, holding that these doctrines do not
apply to assets of a charitable corporation that have been received for
it
services rendered or to income from the investment of those receipts, 120
being within the power of the board to determine their disposition.
Others go further, arguing that the doctrines should apply only to gifts

113.
114.
115.
116.

Id.
See infra notes 191-95 and accompanying text.
Charities Act, 1993, c. 10, § 13 (Eng.).
Charities Act, 2006, c. 50, § 18 (Eng.).

117. See id. § 18(4).
118. Id.
119. Restatement (Third) of Trusts § 67 (2003); Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 399

(1959).
120. See Principles of the Law of Nonprofit Orgs. § 240 cmt. a (Preliminary Draft No. 3,

2005).
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specifically designated to be used for named purposes or to be permanently
12 1
held as an endowment.
Preliminary Draft No. 3 of the Principles of Nonprofit Law contains a
liberal position in this regard. Section 240 provides that the governing
board of a charity other than a charitable trust may change its purpose to
another charitable purpose without the need to determine that the current
purpose has failed. 12 2 The determination of a new purpose is to be
considered a matter of business judgment, not subject to judicial review
except for abuse of discretion. 12 3 In contrast, restricted gifts are subject to
the rule applicable to charitable trusts, requiring that the nonprofit
corporation institute judicial proceedings to change the purposes of those
gifts, unless their terms provide otherwise. 124 This proposed rule follows
from a decision by the drafter that there is a difference in the legal regime
of trusts and corporations, that founders of charities are free to choose the
regime they wish, and that charitable trustees will be limited in their ability
to change purposes, while a corporate board has broad freedom to change
its purposes and to apply existing funds to the new purposes, with some
25
limitations described below. 1
The draft Principles also posit a duty to keep the purposes of the charity
current and useful, thereby rejecting a duty of obedience to the extent that it
prevents a board from altering purposes prospectively. 126
Most
importantly, there is no requirement that the new purposes reasonably
approximate or reasonably relate to the prior purposes. This proposed rule
is contrary to the law in a number of states and the reporter of the
Restatement acknowledged that such a liberal policy may have untoward
consequences that may require some degree of state oversight or greater
judicial control, as for example when the purposes of a charitable hospital
are changed after its conversion to support the arts, or, as posited in a
Massachusetts case, from operating a home for abandoned animals to
127
support of "research vivisectionists."
Section 245 of the draft Principles provides that a charity other than a
charitable trust, after it has changed its purposes, may use its assets, other
than restricted gifts imposing contrary requirements, for any pre- or postamendment charitable purpose. 128 The effect of this is that restricted gifts
must be applied for their original purpose unless the gift instrument
provides for modification, UMIFA is available, or there is judicial
reformation under cy pres or deviation. However, the other corporate

121. See id.
122. See id. § 240(c)(1).
123. See id. § 240(c)(2).
124. See id. § 240(a).
125. See id. § 240 cmt. a.
126. See id.
127. See id. § 240 cmt. d (quoting Att'y Gen. v. Hahnemann Hosp., 494 N.E.2d 1011,
1021 n.18 (Mass. 1986)).
128. Id. § 245.
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assets, namely unrestricted gifts and non-donated assets may be directed by
the board to any purposes, old or new. This includes income received from
the sale of goods and services as well as income earned from investment of
earnings and of unrestricted gifts. 129 The assumption is that unless a donor
specifically imposes restrictions, he has implicitly consented to future
amendments to the purposes for which his gifts may be used.
Statutes in twenty-three states govern the distribution of assets on
dissolution of charitable corporations, requiring application of the property
under the cy pres doctrine, but with no requirement of a showing of general
charitable intent, although an expressly stated right of reversion will be
respected. 130 In New York, the courts have articulated what is described as
a quasi-cy pres doctrine that applies to the general assets upon dissolution
of a charitable corporation under which the degree of proximity to its
original purposes is more relaxed than is the case with charitable trusts or
13
restricted funds of charitable corporations. 1
As a practical matter, state laws governing dissolution of charitable
corporations and termination of charitable trusts rest on a floor provided by
a requirement for obtaining exemption from federal income taxes under §
501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code, which requires a charity's
governing instrument to contain a provision stating that upon dissolution or
termination, its assets must be distributed to other organizations then
exempt from federal income tax. 132 This test can be met if there is a similar
requirement under state law that is enforced locally. In 1982, the IRS
issued a revenue procedure stating that only eight states had enacted
legislation meeting the Code requirements, so that charities in the remaining
states and the District of Columbia were required to adopt an express
dissolution provision. 133 This requirement has been of great importance in
the vast number of states in which charity law is not actively enforced, and
it set a precedent for federal and state cooperation that was extended in the
1969 private foundation provisions described below.
G. Expanding and EnhancingState Enforcement
There has been far less current interest in expanding or improving
regulation of charities at the state level than in issues of governance. Only
eight states require charitable corporations and trusts to register and file
annual financial reports with the attorney general, one more than was the
case in 1965.134 All states exempt religious organizations from these
requirements, while California and New York exempt educational
organizations, and California also exempts hospitals. In four other states,

129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.

Id. § 245 cmt. a.
See Fremont-Smith, supra note 2, at 185.
N.Y. Not-for-Profit Corp. Law § 1005 (Consol. 2006).
Treas. Reg. § 1.50 1(c)(3)-1(b)(4) (2006).
See Rev. Proc. 82-2, 1982-1 C.B. 367.
See Fremont-Smith, supra note 2, at 476-95.
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certain charitable trusts must register and report, but they are few in number
compared to charitable corporations. Active enforcement programs are in
place in almost all of these twelve states and in a handful of others, notably
Pennsylvania.
In 2006, the Commissioners on Uniform State Laws
considered revisiting the Uniform Supervision of Trustees for Charitable
Funds Act or simply repealing it for lack of interest. Although thirty-nine
states regulate solicitation of charitable funds from the general public, these
statutes are framed in terms of consumer protection, not the administration
of charitable assets. 135 The 2004 California statute requiring mandatory
audits does contain provisions regulating professional fund-raisers, while
the New York legislation that was adopted clarifies state laws regarding
dissolutions and terminations of charities. 136 Neither legislature has passed
provisions that would extend the enforcement powers of the attorney
general and the courts. The original bill submitted to the legislature by the
Massachusetts attorney general in 2005 contained provisions that would
have clarified his enforcement powers, but after objections from the
137
nonprofit community, these provisions were deleted.
The Ohio attorney general took another approach to expanding his
enforcement powers in 2006. Rather than seeking legislation, he issued a
set of proposed amendments to the regulations under the Ohio Charitable
Trust Act that would, among other changes, have had the effect of limiting
or eliminating the payment of fiduciary compensation, mandating audit
committees and the adoption of conflict of interest policies, and greatly
increasing the scope of annual financial reports. 138 The attorney general
suggested that conflict of interest policies, together with excessive
compensation and expense reimbursement policies, should be adopted,
coupled with expanded annual reporting requirements designed to elicit
compliance with the recommendations, with threat of an investigation for
failure to comply. 139 The proposals generated widespread criticism from
the sector, particularly from hospitals and health-care agencies, which were
targeted in the proposed regulations. The proposals were subsequently
amended, shrinking from forty-six pages to seven. The revisions included
measures to increase the investigatory powers of the attorney general and
the establishment of a citizens' advisory committee to assist him in the

135. See id. at 317.
136. See Nonprofit Integrity Act of 2004, Cal. Gov't Code § 12586 (West 2004); N.Y.
Not-for-Profit Corp. Law § 1002 (Consol. 2006).
137. Compare Office of Mass. Att'y Gen. Tom Reilly, An Act to Promote the Financial
Integrity of Public Charities:
Summary of Draft 1.0 (n.d.), available at
http://www.cof.org/files/Documents/Building%20Strong%20Ethical%20Foundations/Mass
AG.Act to promote fin integ.pub-charities.pdf (last visited Oct. 27, 2007), with H.B.
4347, 184th Gen. Court, Reg. Sess. (Mass. 2005).
138. Ohio Att'y Gen., Proposed Changes to Ohio Administrative Code 109:1-1,
http://www.ag.state.oh.us/spotlight/cgrules.asp (last visited Oct. 27, 2007).
139. See id.
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execution of his duties under the Act. 14 0 The Massachusetts attorney
general appointed such a committee in 1961 without legislative
authorization, and succeeding attorneys general have followed the
precedent. 14 1 In 2001, the Illinois legislature enacted a bill directing
establishment of a permanent charitable advisory committee in the office of
the attorney general. 14 2 It is the only state in which such a committee has
been created by the legislature.
Legislation introduced in the District of Columbia in 2006 and adopted in
the spring of 2007 was designed to improve the regulation of charities; the
District of Columbia is unique in that the D.C. attorney general has
traditionally taken the position that he has no power to regulate charities.
The D.C. bill, drafted at the request of the mayor, amended the D.C.
nonprofit corporation, charitable solicitation, and consumer protection acts,
substituting the attorney general for the mayor as the official authorized to
institute involuntary dissolutions, and granting him new remedies and
investigatory powers. 143 This initiative is unique in D.C. history and of
particular importance in light of the fact that almost all federally chartered
charitable corporations are within the jurisdiction of the District of
Columbia.
Proposed legislation introduced in Texas in 2005 would have mandated
audits for certain charities and required that the financial reports be made
publicly available to the attorney general and to the general public on
demand under the same terms and conditions that apply under the Internal
Revenue Code to Form 990, the annual information return required of
public charities. 144 Monetary penalties would be imposed for violation of
the requirements. The bill did not pass during the 2005 legislative session.
A different approach to annual reports was taken in a bill introduced in
the Hawaii legislature in 2007 that would amend the Nonprofit Corporation
Act by requiring nonprofit corporations with gross revenue of $1 million or
more, excluding revenue from certain government c6ntracts, to file annually
a complete audited financial report with the department of corporations. 145
Willful or persistent failure to file would constitute a breach of the
directors' and officers' duty and subject them and the corporation to suit by

140. Revised Proposed Changes to Ohio Administrative Code 109:1-1 (n.d.), available at
http://www.oano.org/Docs/AGRevised.pdf (last visited Oct. 27, 2007).

141. See David Biemesderfer & Andras Kosaras, Forum of Reg'l Ass'ns of Grantmakers
& Council on Founds., The Value of Relationships Between State Charity Regulators &
Philanthropy
(2006),
available
http://www.givingforun.org/s-forum/bin.asp?CID=4115&DID=9298&DOC=FILE.PDF

at

(conducting a study of several models of nonprofit sector and attorney general working
relationships).
142. Solicitation for Charity Act, 225 Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. 460/23 (West 2007).
143. See Nonprofit Organizations Oversight Improvement Amendment Act of 2007, 54
D.C. Reg. 4085 (Apr. 19, 2007) (amending D.C. Code §§ 28-3901(a)(3), 29-301.53, 441712(c) (2001)).
144. S.B. 1215, 79th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Tex. 2005).
145. S.B. 73, 24th Leg., Reg. Sess. § 2 (Haw. 2007).
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the attorney general. 14 6 It was unclear whether the reports would be public
record, but in all events the provision would have the effect of establishing
a registry of financial information about nonprofit corporations in the state.
Noteworthy is the fact that the provisions appear to apply to all nonprofit
corporations, not just charities.
In contrast to the lack of interest in expanding the powers of state
attorneys general to enforce the duties of charitable fiduciaries, during the
period between 1996 and 2000, twenty-five states enacted thirty statutes to
regulate the conversion of nonprofit charities, most notably hospitals and
health insurance providers, to for-profit status. 14 7 These statutes were in
response to a number of conversions in which assets were sold for less than
fair market value to insiders, and the proceeds of sale passed into private
hands rather than being held for continuing charitable purposes. 14 8 Several
proposed conversions involved charities operating in several states and
entailed what became conflicts between state officials attempting to assert
jurisdiction to prevent charitable assets from leaving the state. 149 The speed
with which the states acted was undoubtedly due to the size of the assets
involved and the importance of health-care corporations to the communities
involved. It is of interest that despite these developments, one of the Senate
Finance Committee staff proposals described below would transfer
regulation of conversions from the states to the IRS, regardless of the fact
that the power of the IRS to regulate these transactions is extremely limited.
II. FEDERAL LAW: SIGNIFICANT DEVELOPMENTS AND PROPOSALS

A. The Proponentsof Change
Traditionally, the Treasury Department, working primarily with the
House Ways and Means Committee, has taken the lead in framing major
revisions of the Internal Revenue Code. In some instances, the Finance
Committee has assumed primary responsibility for framing amendments,
usually on discrete matters that are of particular interest to its leaders. Such
has been the case in recent years. In 2003, Senator Chuck Grassley, then
chairman of the Finance Committee, together with his counterpart, Senator
Max Baucus, supported a major research project that resulted in a staff
report containing proposals to amend not only the substantive restrictions
on charities, but also to vastly expand federal regulation of exempt
150
organizations.
In the fall of 2006, Senator Grassley conducted hearings on hospitals,
focusing on the amount of charity care they were providing and the

146. Id. § 6(g).
147.
148.
149.
150.

See Fremont-Smith, supra note 2, at 432.
See id.
See id. at 366-67.
See Staff of S. Fin. Comm., supra note 38.
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compensation of their officers. 15 1 During this same period, the minority
staff of the Finance Committee prepared a report entitled Investigation of
Jack Abramoff's Use of Tax-Exempt Organizations,152 which contained
recommendations that are described below.
During this same period, the Ways and Means Committee also focused
on hospitals and other health-care organizations. The chairman conducted a
series of hearings in 2005 during which he questioned the rationale for tax
exemption of these organizations-and others that rely principally on
receipts for services. 153 The issues raised for the hospitals were the degree
of charity care they were providing and whether and how they can be
differentiated from for-profit corporations that provide the same services for
a fee. This question is not new to Congress; in the past it has been raised in
connection with the effectiveness of the tax on unrelated business income
and the degree to which "commerciality" in operations should be
considered incompatible with exemption.
A third source for proposals for amendments to the Internal Revenue
Code has been the Joint Committee on Taxation, a standing committee of
Congress which serves as a permanent resource for the tax committees.
The Joint Committee advises on technical matters, prepares estimates of the
revenue effect of proposed legislation as well as background information
for the committees during hearings, and provides summaries of tax
legislation that become the basis of the legislative history of specific bills.
The Joint Committee, in January 2005, issued a major set of proposals to
amend the Internal Revenue Code provisions governing tax-exempt
charities, in some instances endorsing the 2004 proposals from the Finance
Committee staff, while in others suggesting more stringent limits. 154 In
addition to committee recommendations, from time to time individual
legislators will introduce reform proposals. Historically, it was not
uncommon for members of Congress to conduct hearings and otherwise
promote their initiatives individually, the most prominent being
Representative Wright Patman who is credited as the originator of the
restrictions on private foundations enacted as part of the Tax Reform Act of

151. See Taking the Pulse of Charitable Care and Community Benefits at Nonprofit
Hospitals: HearingBefore the S. Comm. on Finance, 109th Cong. (2006) (statement of Sen.

Chuck Grassley, Chairman, S. Fin. Comm.).
152. See Minority Staff of S. Comm. on Fin., 109th Cong., Investigation of Jack

Abramoff's Use of Tax-Exempt Organizations (Comm. Print 2006) [hereinafter Abramoff
Investigation].
153. See The Tax-Exempt Hospital Sector: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Ways and
Means, 109th Cong. 4-7 (2005) [hereinafter The Tax-Exempt Hospital Sector] (statement of
Bill Thomas, Chairman); Review of Credit Union Tax Exemption: Hearing Before the H.
Comm. on Ways and Means, 109th Cong. 4-6 (2005) [hereinafter Credit Union Tax
Exemption] (statement of Bill Thomas, Chairman).
154. See Staff of J. Comm. on Taxation, 109th Cong., Options to Improve Tax

Compliance and Reform Tax Expenditures (Comm. Print 2005) [hereinafter Staff of J.
Comm.], available at http://www.house.gov/jct/s-2-05.pdf.
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1969.155 The power of individual members of Congress is no longer
comparable to that of the 1960s and 1970s.
The Tax Section of the ABA has always been a major proponent of
changes in the tax code, and its Committee on Exempt Organizations has
primary responsibility for providing analysis and commentary on
amendments affecting organizations under its jurisdiction. Within the
nonprofit sector, there are myriad organizations that lobby on behalf of their
members and the sector at large. Notable are Independent Sector and the
Council on Foundations, while there are several hundred organizations
formed to support various segments of the nonprofit universe.
In 2005, in response to requests from Senators Grassley and Baucus to
respond to the proposals from the Finance Committee staff, 156 Independent
Sector instituted a Panel on the Nonprofit Sector. The panel issued a
preliminary report in March 2005,157 a final report the following June,'158
and a supplemental report in June 2006.159 Shortly thereafter, the panel
instituted a special committee to consider self-regulation, 160 with a report
anticipated in early 2007. The panel made major efforts to include the
entire nonprofit community in its deliberations through a web site, 161 a
number of regional open meetings, and open conference calls. The specific
recommendations from these groups are summarized below.
B. RegulatingSelf-Dealing by Fiduciariesof Public Charities: The Excess
Benefit Provisions of§ 4958 of the InternalRevenue Code
The first major change in the substantive provisions of the Internal
Revenue Code dealing with tax-exempt charities since 1969 was the
passage in 1996 of prohibitions on certain self-dealing transactions between
publicly supported charities and persons who were in positions to exert
substantial influence over the organization. 162 The prohibitions are
155. See Fremont-Smith, supra note 2, at 72-76.
156. See Letter from Sen. Chuck Grassley, Chairman, S. Fin. Comm., & Sen. Max
Baucus, Ranking Member, S. Fin. Comm., to Diana Aviv, President and CEO, Indep. Sector
(Sept. 22, 2004), available at http://www.nonprofitpanel.org/about/SFCltr.pdf.
157. See Panel on the Nonprofit Sector, Interim Report Presented to the Senate Finance
Committee (2005), available at http://www.nonprofitpanel.org/interim/PanelReport.pdf.
158. See Panel on the Nonprofit Sector, Strengthening Transparency, Governance,
Accountability of Charitable Organizations: A Final Report to Congress and the Nonprofit
Sector
(2005)
[hereinafter
Panel,
Final
Report],
available
at
http://www.nonprofitpanel.org/final/Panel FinalReport.pdf.
159. See Panel on the Nonprofit Sector, Strengthening Transparency, Governance,
Accountability of Charitable Organizations: A Supplement to the Final Report to Congress
and the Nonprofit Sector (2006) [hereinafter Panel, Supplement], available at
http://www.nonprofitpanel.org/supplement/PanelSupplementFinal.pdf.
160. See Panel on the Nonprofit Sector, New Committee to Advise the Panel on the
Nonprofit
Sector
on
Self-Regulation
(2006),
http://www.nonprofitpanel.org/press/advisorygroup/index.html.
161. See Panel on the Nonprofit Sector, http://www.nonprofitpanel.org (last visited Sept.
17, 2007).
162. See Pub. L. No. 104-168, § 1311, 110 Stat. 1452, 1475-79 (1996) (codified at I.R.C.
§ 4958 (2000)).
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described as "intermediate sanctions" by virtue of the fact that the penalty
for breach of the prohibitions is not loss of tax exemption, 163 as is the case
with the prohibitions against private benefit and private inurement that have
always applied to all tax-exempt charities. 164 Instead, the provisions call
for imposition of excise taxes on any "disqualified persons" who receive the
excess benefit and those managers of the charity who willfully approved of
the arrangement knowing that it was prohibited. 165 Disqualified persons are
defined as those in a position to exercise substantial influence over the
charity, 166 whether or not they have official positions as directors, officers,
or trustees. 167 Although the Code provisions follow in form the absolute
prohibitions on self-dealing applicable since 1969 to private foundations'
transactions, self-dealing transactions between publicly supported charities
and their disqualified persons are permitted so long as the disqualified
persons do not receive more than fair market value and the excise tax is
68
applied only to the amount of the excess benefit. 1
The IRS, as well as Independent Sector and most commentators,
recognize that revocation of exemption is an inappropriate tool for
enforcing fiduciary duties and have long supported this legislation. 169 In
some instances revocation is too severe a sanction; in others, it is not a
sufficient deterrent, because it may harm the charity while permitting the
persons responsible for the transgressions to continue to control its destiny.
The 2004 proposals from the staff of the Senate Finance Committee,
described in the following section, recommended repealing these provisions
and substituting for them the more drastic prohibitions against any selfdealing that apply to private foundations. In contrast, the Joint Committee
on Taxation recommended tightening the existing excess benefit rules,
while adding a tax on the charity itself, contrary to the recommendations of
virtually all scholars who have considered the efficacy of the tax-exemption
provisions.
C. Reform Proposalsfrom the Staff of the 2004 Senate Finance Committee,
the PensionProtection Act of 2006, and Responses from the Sector
As noted above, the most recent impetus for change in federal nonprofit
law and regulation has centered on a set of legislative proposals circulated
by the staff of the Senate Finance Committee in the spring of 2004.170 In
addition to tightening numerous substantive provisions governing the
administration of tax-exempt charities, these proposals were designed to
expand the enforcement powers of the IRS and the federal courts by
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.

See I.R.C. § 4958(a)(1)-(2) (2000).
See Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(c)(2) (2006); id. § 1.501(c)(3)-l(d)(1)(ii).
See I.R.C. § 4958.
See id. § 4958(f)(1); Treas. Reg. § 53.4958-3 (2002).
See I.R.C. § 4941.
See id. § 4958(c)(1)(A); Treas. Reg. § 53.4958-1; id. § 53.4958-4.
See Fremont-Smith, supra note 2, at 99-100, 379.
See Staff of S. Fin. Comm., supra note 38.
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providing them with new enforcement tools that are currently available only
in state courts, 17 1 as well as granting standing to members of the general
72
public to sue charities and their fiduciaries for breach of the federal rules.,
The report issued by the Joint Committee on Taxation in January 2005173
contained proposed amendments to the Internal Revenue Code that in
almost all instances are more restrictive than those recommended by the
Finance Committee staff. 174 The hearings held by the Ways and Means
Committee in 2005 considered revisions to the basic requirements for
exemption of hospitals and, possibly, other charities that rely for financial
support primarily on fees for services, questioning whether they deserved
similarity to for-profit entities
the benefits of tax exemption in light of their
75
conducting essentially identical activities. 1
In September 2006, the Senate Finance Committee took up the question
of exemptions for hospitals, echoing some of the concerns of the Ways and
Means Committee, but focusing primarily on the efficacy of Code
provisions requiring hospitals to provide charity care and community
benefit as a condition for exemption. 17 6 The chairman also indicated
concern with high levels of executive compensation and benefits being
provided by nonprofit hospitals, and indicated that his staff would be
77
drafting corrective legislation. 1
1. The Pension Protection Act of 2006
In August 2006, Congress enacted the Pension Protection Act of 2006,
which contained provisions affecting charities and their donors. 178 Almost
all of the provisions follow the spirit if not the letter of a number of the
proposals made by the staffs of the Senate Finance Committee and the Joint
Committee on Taxation. Among the provisions designed to "responsibly
regulate exempt organizations,"'] 79 organizations previously exempt from
filing annual returns because their gross receipts did not exceed $25,000
will henceforth be required to file an annual notice containing current
contact and some basic financial information. 180 The Act increased the
rates of fines and penalties applicable to public charities and private

171. See id. at 16-17.
172. Seeid. at 17-18.

173. See Staff of J. Comm., supra note 154.
174. See id. at 220-337.
175. See, e.g., The Tax-Exempt Hospital Sector, supra note 153; Credit Union Tax
Exemption, supra note 153.
176. See Taking the Pulse of Charitable Care and Community Benefits at Nonprofit
Hospitals: HearingBefore the S. Comm. on Finance, supra note 151.
177. See id.
178. See Pension Protection Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-280, 120 Stat. 780 (codified in
scattered sections of the I.R.C. and 29 U.S.C.).
179. Rep. Bill Thomas, H. Comm. on Ways and Means, The Pension Protection Act of
2006:
Detailed Summary of Charitable Provisions 2 (2006), available at
http://waysandmeans.house.gov/media/pdf/taxdocs/072806charitable.pdf.
180. See Pension Protection Act of 2006 § 1223, I.R.C. § 6033 (West 2007).
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foundations; 18 1 required public disclosure of the information contained in
Form 990-T, the return filed by organizations that receive taxable unrelated
business income; 182 adopted new substantiation rules for gifts of tangible
personal property; 83 and included new requirements for exemption for
credit counseling organizations, 184 a category of tax-exempt entities that
had been of particular concern to the Finance Committee leadership 85 as
well as the Government Relations and the House Ways and Means
Committees.
The most far-reaching changes in the Pension Protection Act will affect
two types of charities whose operations had been of particular concern to
the Finance Committee during its 2004 and 2005 hearings: donor-advised
funds and "supporting organizations"-defined in § 509(a)(3) of the
Internal Revenue Code' 86 as organizations that qualify as public charities
rather than private foundations by virtue of their connection to and support
of other public charities.1 87 In addition to directing the Treasury to conduct
a one-year study of these entities to determine if additional restrictions are
necessary,1 88 the Act extended the excess benefit transactions prohibitions
to certain transactions between them and their donors and other related
parties and added new requirements designed to increase the degree of
accountability of certain supporting organizations to the public charities
they support. 189 These provisions are described more fully below. Finally,
the Act contained a provision long advocated by the Joint Committee on
Taxation and state charity officials that permits the IRS to exchange
information with state regulators about charities violating the Code
90
provisions. 1
The need for greater understanding and cooperation between state
attorneys general and the IRS was highlighted in an October 2006
unanimous decision of the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, U.S.
Trust Co. v. Attorney General.19 1 The case was brought by the trustee of a
perpetual trust established in 1959 to apply the net income to provide
scholarships in amounts not to exceed $400 each to graduates of the high

181. See id. § 1212, I.R.C. §§ 4941-4945, 4958.
182. See id. § 1225, I.R.C. § 6104.
183. See id. §§ 1218-1219, Pub. L. No. 109-280, 120 Stat. 780, 1080-86 (codified in
scattered sections of the 1.R.C.).
184. See id. § 1220, I.R.C. §§ 501, 513.
185. See Credit Union Tax Exemption, supra note 153.
186. See, e.g., Charitiesand CharitableGiving: Proposalsfor Reform: HearingBefore
the S. Comm. on Finance, 109th Cong. 33-35 (2005) (statement of Dr. Jane Gravelle, Senior

Specialist in Economic Policy, Congressional Research Service).
187. See Pension Protection Act of 2006 § 1241, I.R.C. § 509(a)(3).
188. See id. § 1226, Pub. L. No. 109-280, 120 Stat. 780, 1094 (codified in scattered
sections of the I.R.C.).
189. See id. §§ 1231-1235, 1241-1245, Pub. L. No. 109-280, 120 Stat. 780, 1094-1108
(codified in scattered sections of the I.R.C.).
190. See id. § 1224, Pub. L. No. 109-280, 120 Stat. 780, 1091-93 (codified in scattered
sections of the I.R.C.).
191. 854 N.E.2d 1231 (Mass. 2006).
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school in the city in which the donor resided. 192 In its petition, the trustee
requested the court to modify the terms of the trust in three respects. 193 The
court granted its requests to include students from other high schools
established in the city and to increase the amount of the individual
scholarships. 194 It refused, however, a request to permit the trustee to
increase the aggregate annual distributions to equal the amount required to
be distributed by private foundations under § 4942 of the Internal Revenue
Code, currently equal to 5% of the value of the foundation's investment
assets. 195 The trustee had alleged that the change was necessary if the trust
was to avoid the tax on private foundations imposed96under § 4942 (as well
as under Massachusetts General Laws section 68A).1
At the time the petition was filed, this tax was equal to 15% of the
difference between the required distribution and the amount actually
distributed at the end of each tax year in which it remains undistributed.
The Pension Reform Act of 2006 increased the tax to 30%, effective for tax
years after August 2006. The court held that such a change, although it
would "avoid a relatively small tax," would result in annual distributions of
a large portion of the principal, thereby departing from the donor's intent
that the trust be perpetual. 197 This conclusion ignored, as did the briefs
submitted by attorneys for the trustee, the fact that § 4942 provides for two
levels of tax: an initial tax equal at the date the decision was rendered to
30% of any undistributed amounts remaining at the end of each tax year,
and an additional.tax equal to 100% of the amount remaining undistributed
at the end of such year and each succeeding one. Thus the court's
conclusion that without reformation it would be possible to use some of the
income for scholarships and the rest for tax without touching the principal
misstates the effect of its decision. It reflects a basic misunderstanding of
the Internal Revenue Code provisions, the Massachusetts statute that
applies the federal rules to all private foundations in the state, and the state
statutes and cases adopting the Uniform Prudent Investor Rule, the Uniform
Principal and Income Act, and liberal interpretations of the doctrines of cy
pres and deviation.
Seven months after U.S. Trust Company, the Massachusetts court
effectively overruled the case, noting that the impact of the second level tax
had not been brought to its attention during oral argument. The court
stated, "It is now apparent that our reasoning on the matter ...rested on
incomplete information and, therefore, is incorrect and creates a precedent
that should not be followed in like situations."' 98 The court suggested that
192. Id. at 1232-33.
193. Id. at 1233.
194. Id. at 1233-34.
195. Id. at 1235; see also I.R.C. § 4942 (2000); Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 68A, § 2 (2007)
(applying as a matter of state law the provisions of I.R.C. § 4942 to Massachusetts private
foundations).
196. U.S. Trust Co., 854 N.E.2d at 1235.
197. Id.
198. In re Will of Crabtree, 865 N.E.2d 1119, 1135 n.33 (Mass. 2007).

FORDHAM LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 76

the trustee of the scholarship trust might in the future wish to seek further
reformation and indicated its willingness to reconsider its decision "in order
to achieve consistency in our treatment of similarly situated parties who
appear before us." 199
Greater exchanges of information between state and federal regulators
may not obviate errors of this nature, but one hopes that at the least the
regulators might gain a better understanding of the respective laws it is their
duty to enforce.
2. Pending Proposals from the Senate Finance Committee Staff
As noted above, the 2006 legislation incorporated only a portion of the
more than thirty-five recommendations from the Finance Committee staff.
A few of these recommendations were included in a bill passed by the
Finance Committee on June 28, 2006.200 These included mandating
electronic filing, 20 ' increasing funding to the IRS to combat abusive tax
3
avoidance, 20 2 clarification of the definition of a church tax inquiry,20
increased penalties for certain charities engaging in lobbying and election
activity,20 4 increasing disclosure of certain transactions, 20 5 and extending
declaratory judgment procedures now available to charities to other exempt
20 6
organizations.
Not included in the new and pending legislation as of October 2006 were
recommendations that eligibility for exemption be reevaluated every five
209
years; 20 7 improvements to Forms 990 and 990-PF; 20 8 mandatory audits
2
10
and IRS compilation of uniform reporting standards;
establishment of a
certification system to assure compliance with a set of best practices
monitored by the IRS and reporting by charities of their compliance with
performance standards; 2 1 1 prohibitions against payment of compensation to
trustees and directors and limits on reimbursement for travel expenses; 212 a
requirement of a minimum of three and a maximum of fifteen directors of

199. Id.
200. Staff of J.Comm. on Taxation, 109th Cong., Description of the Chairman's
Modification to the Provisions of S. 1321, The "Telephone Excise Tax Repeal Act of 2005"
and S.832, The "Taxpayer Protection and Assistance Act of 2005" (2006).
201. See id. at 14-15.
202. See id. at 21.
203. See id. at 22.
204. See id. at 58-60.
205. See id. at 62-64.
206. See id. at 123.
207. See Staff of S. Fin. Comm., supra note 38, at 1.
208. See id. at 7-9.
209. See id. at 9.
210. See id.
211. See id. at 11-14.
212. See id. at 5-6.
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all charities, and that a majority of the directors
be independent; 2 13 and
2 14
adoption of a federal prudent investor rule.

Among the remaining proposals of the Finance Committee staff designed
to enhance regulation were provisions to provide funds to the states for
enforcement, to permit the IRS to remove fiduciaries and employees if they
were found to have violated the self-dealing rules, and to grant equity
powers to the Tax Court to enforce the Code provisions, similar to the
powers held by state courts. 2 15 Those powers would include the ability to
remove directors and trustees, require restitution, impose surcharges, issue
injunctions, and order dissolutions.2 1 6 The staff also proposed to empower
co-fiduciaries and private citizens to bring suit in federal court to enforce
the Code restrictions. 21 7 Finally, the staff recommended that solicitation of
charitable donations and conversion of charities to for-profit status be
regulated by the IRS, 2 18 rather than remain the province of the states as they
presently are.
3. Recommendations from the Panel on the Nonprofit Sector
In response to the Finance Committee proposals, the Panel on the
Nonprofit Sector supported tightening Code provisions affecting donor
advised funds and supporting organizations, 2 19 increasing the exchange of
information between the IRS and state regulators, 220 and requiring annual
status reports from small organizations exempt from filing annual
information returns. 2 2 1 All of these recommendations were part of the 2006
Pension Protection Act. The panel also recommended mandating audits for
organizations with annual revenues
of $1 million or more and requiring
222
public disclosure of their contents.
Among proposals to amend governance and administration that the panel
did not endorse were those that would require disclosure of performance
data, 223 prohibit payment of compensation to fiduciaries, 224 limit foreign
grant making, 225 and enact a federal prudent investor rule. 226 The panel
also objected to certain of the proposals designed to improve regulation,
2 27
specifically those that would require periodic review of exempt status,

213.
214.
215.
216.
217.
218.
219.
220.
221.
222.
223.
224.
225.
226.
227.

See id. at 13.
See id. at 15.
See id. at 13-16.
See id. at 16.
See id. at 17-18.
See id. at 6-7.
See Panel, Final Report, supra note 158, at 39-48.
See id. at 24.
See id. at 26.
See id. at 35.
See id. at 37.
See Panel, Supplement, supra note 159, at 13-15.
See id. at 5-6.
See id. at 16-17.
See Panel, Final Report, supra note 158, at 33-34.
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regulate conversions, 228 provide the federal courts with equity powers 22 9
regulate charitable solicitations, 2 30 and mandate public disclosure of Form
990-T reports of unrelated business income. 23 1 Of these, only the final one
requiring public disclosure of Form 990-T was enacted in the Pension
Protection Act of 2006.
There is a final important recommendation, not clearly articulated in the
Finance Committee staff proposals, but developed in the panel report, that
is designed to achieve better coordination of federal and state regulatory
efforts. Section 508(e) of the Code conditions tax exemption for a private
foundation on the inclusion in its governing document of a provision
requiring compliance with the limitations on private foundation operations
contained in chapter 42 and prohibits its managers from entering into any
self-dealing transactions prohibited in that chapter. 232 Instead of inclusion
of the requisite language in articles of organization or trust documents,
regulations promulgated in 1972 provide that the governing instrument
requirement can be met if a valid state law imposes these obligations on all
private foundations within its jurisdiction. 23 3 By 1975, forty-eight states
and the District of Columbia had passed such laws. 2 34 These laws "have
provided state regulatory officials with grounds for prosecuting failures to
comply with federally imposed rules, an unprecedented example of
235
coordination of the two regulatory schemes."
Under the panel's proposal, a similar provision would apply to all
publicly supported charities (the remaining universe of organizations
exempt under § 501(c)(3)), requiring compliance with the excess benefit
provisions § 4958 of the Code. 2 36 Maine adopted such a provision in its
2002 act, 237 and a similar requirement is part of the bill submitted by the
238
Massachusetts attorney general in 2005 to improve state regulation.
However, it is unlikely that other states will follow suit without impetus
from Congress, as was the case in the 1970s. Furthermore, there are no
reported instances in which a state has taken legal action against a private
foundation solely on the grounds of failure to comply with these state
provisions. This does not mean that the prohibitions have not served as a
deterrent, nor that threat of state litigation has not resulted in corrections.
At best, it provides one more weapon for regulators and contributes to
uniformity among the states.

228.
229.
230.
231.

See
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Panel, Supplement, supra note 159, at 18-20.
id. at 28-29.
id. at 10-12.
id. at 26-27.

232. I.R.C. § 508(e) (2000).
233.
234.
235.
236.
237.
238.

Treas. Reg. § 1.508-3(d) (as amended in 1980).
Fremont-Smith, supra note 2, at 267.
See id.
See Panel, Final Report, supra note 158, at 24-25.
See Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 13-B, § 718 (2003).
See H.B. 4347, 184th Gen. Court, Reg. Sess. (Mass. 2005).
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4. Situs of Federal Regulation: A New Agency and Other Proposals
The role of the IRS as regulator of tax-exempt entities has long been
subject to question by commentators, government officials, and
practitioners. Proposals to create a new agency to regulate charities, some
modeled on the English Charity Commissioners, some on the Securities and
Exchange Commission or the quasi-governmental bodies which operate in
conjunction with it, have been considered. 2 39 In the mid-1970s, the Filer
Commission report contained proposals for alternative regulatory schemes,
but they received little attention in succeeding years. 240
Some
commentators argue that improvements in IRS administration of the taxexemption provisions warrant continuing its role, although they uniformly
argue that funding for its operations has been inadequate. 24 1 Most recently,
Marcus Owens, former director of the Exempt Organization Division of the
IRS, has suggested moving enforcement to a new agency modeled on the
National Association of Securities Dealers.2 42 This would be a quasi-public
agency, financed in part by credits against the excise tax on private
foundations or a licensing fee, operating in conjunction with the IRS as the
National Association of Securities Dealers does, with the new body
granting exemptions and receiving and reviewing annual reports. 243 Other
proposals, old and new, have focused on increasing cooperation between
federal and state regulators, in particular by permitting the IRS to refrain
from imposing sanctions if the state attorney general has taken corrective
action. 244 There is precedent for this in § 507, under which the IRS may
abate the confiscatory tax that is imposed on private foundations under
certain extreme circumstances if corrective action has been taken under
state law to assure that the assets of the foundation have been preserved for
24 5
charitable purposes under order of a state court.
Extending the application of an abatement power to violations of the
Code would provide the IRS and the federal courts with the broader range
of equity powers held by the state courts, affording remedies directly
designed to preserve charitable funds. It must be recognized however, that
there is a general lack of interest by the states in suggestions of this nature,
undoubtedly due to budget constraints. To overcome the states' failure to
act, some have suggested that Congress could provide subsidies to those
states that adopt the federal requirements for administration of charities and

239. See Fremont-Smith, supra note 2, at 462-63.
240. See id. at 461-66.
241. See, e.g., Fremont-Smith, supra note 2, at 471; Panel on the Nonprofit Sector, Work
Group No. 14:
Funding for Federal and State Enforcement (2005), available at
http://www.nonprofitpanel.org/workgrouprecs/Initial14.pdf.
242. See Marcus S. Owens, Charity Oversight:
An Alternative Approach (2006),
available
at
http://www.ksghauser.harvard.edu/PDFXLS/workingpapers/workingpaper_33.4.pdf.
243. See id. at 9-14.
244. See Fremont-Smith, supra note 2, at 460.
245. See I.R.C. § 507(g) (2000).
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establish enforcement programs that conform to federal rules. There is
precedent for such subsidies in the administration of social security and
unemployment benefit provisions, but little impetus in Congress to increase
funding for enforcement of nonprofits, whether by the IRS or the states.
D. Finance Committee Minority Staff Report on Jack Abramoff's Use of
Tax-Exempt Organizations
In September 2005, the minority staff of the Senate Finance Committee
issued a report summarizing findings from a 2005 investigation of Jack
246
Abramoffs use of charities to further his and his clients' personal ends.
The report contained detailed summaries of the relationship of five taxexempt charities to Abramoff247 and a set of recommendations for
amendments to the Internal Revenue Code suggested for consideration by
the majority staff and the members of the Finance Committee. 2 48 The
report proposed to expand the definition of lobbying to include payment of
travel, meals, and similar expenses of a government official by a §
501(c)(3) organization if a registered lobbyist is a disqualified person or a
substantial contributor to the charity. 249 An additional proposal would
further expand the definition of lobbying activity to cover lobbying of the
executive branch, including lobbying with respect to administrative
agencies and federal appointments. 250 With changes in the composition of
the majority and minority committees in Congress as a result of the
November 2006 elections, it was uncertain as of the end of the year what
the likelihood of congressional attention to these proposals would be in
2007 and thereafter.
CONCLUSION

The length of this summary demonstrates an unprecedented degree of
current interest in charity law. Congress has periodically focused on
charities since the early years of the twentieth century and, following
extensive congressional investigations in 1950 and 1969, substantially
expanded the scope of the Code provisions and the sanctions for violations.
Public disclosure of financial and other data was increasingly relied on to
supplement direct enforcement. Interest in the states has been far less
intense. As noted, aside from the adoption of registration and reporting
requirements and establishment of charity bureaus in ten states in the 1960s
and 1970s (New Hampshire having enacted the first such statute in the
1940s), no similar programs have been instituted, and regulation in the vast
majority of jurisdictions has fallen by default to the IRS.
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250.

See Abramoff Investigation, supra note 152.
See id. at 9-51.
See id. at 52-55.
See id. at 54.
See id.
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NONPROFITA CCOUNTA BILITY

Many of the new initiatives to change state law described herein have
been influenced by the scandals that led to passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley
Act. It is open to question whether these new laws will in fact improve the
administration of nonprofit organizations, although it is too soon to tell.
Reliance on mandatory audits appears to be universally accepted as a
necessary minimum requirement. However, there is no evidence that there
is less wrongdoing by charities in Massachusetts than in other states,
despite the fact that for thirty years audits have been required in
Massachusetts for all charities with gross receipts of $500,000 or more,
25 1
other than religious organizations.
What is notable about the enacted and proposed changes to substantive
state laws is that they have greatly restricted the influence of donors and
their heirs in cases involving a change of purposes necessitated by changed
circumstances. Much has been written about the adverse effect of the dead
hand, and in the past that doctrine has certainly restricted efforts to reform
obsolete charitable purposes. Today that is no longer the case. However,
as the influence of donors has greatly diminished in cases involving a
change of purposes, the opposite has occurred in regard to enforcement.
Here the trend in statutes and cases has been to greatly expand the rights of
donors to bring suit to enforce the terms of their gifts in state courts under
the UTC and as proposed by the Finance Committee staff for the federal
courts. Proponents of expanding standing do express concern as to whether
it will limit the willingness of individuals to serve as directors and
trustees-the same rationale that is put forth by proponents of limiting
liability of fiduciaries and providing them with immunity shields. The
rationale for the change is usually that it is necessary because the states will
not act and some enforcement mechanism is necessary to correct abuses.
At the federal level, the adoption of intermediate sanctions for violation
of the excess benefit transaction provisions was a major turning point in
federal regulation. Congress recognized, as it had failed to in 1969, that
wrongdoing was not confined to private foundations and that the public
could not be relied on to police public charities by withholding
contributions to those whose administrative costs were excessive or who
had dubious records.
The more recent proposals from the Finance Committee staff would
fundamentally change the nature of federal regulation, vastly extending the
power of the IRS to control the manner in which charities are administered.
This is best exemplified in the proposals to condition tax exemption on
compliance with a set of best practices through a certification system, adopt
a federal prudent investment rule, grant the IRS power to remove
fiduciaries, and give the federal courts equity powers to effect corrections.
It is unlikely that such far-reaching changes will become law in the
immediate future, but they have been a valuable impetus to sector-wide
consideration of the optimum methods for policing charities, and as such a
251. See Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 12, § 8F (2006).

FORDHAM LA W RE VIE W

[Vol. 76

most valuable contribution. These changes are being considered through an
unprecedented process, one that can only result in wiser consideration of the
manner in which regulators can achieve greater accountability in the
nonprofit sector.
In considering the principles that should underlie any efforts to improve
governance and accountability in the nonprofit sector, one must take into
account the disparate nature of our current regulatory schemes. Federal and
state laws may coincide, but rarely have they been devised in concert and
rarely have enforcement efforts of the two governmental entities been
coordinated in any meaningful way. The provisions in the 2006 Pension
Protection Act permitting more meaningful exchange of information
between federal and state regulators may lead to a change. It cannot
obliterate the fact that the purposes of the two enforcement regimes are at
base diverse-the purpose of state rules and state regulation is to preserve
charitable funds for the continuing benefit of society as its needs evolve,
while the purpose of the federal rules is to preserve the integrity of the tax
system.
In the 1950s and 1960s, the tax focus was foremost in the eyes of federal
regulators. However, this view changed gradually in the 1960s, particularly
after passage of the 1969 Tax Reform Act, which added intermediate
sanctions to the Code for violation of the private foundation rules. The
change continued with subsequent restructuring of the IRS in response to
the growth of the nonprofit sector, particularly in the number and size of
pension plans under their jurisdiction following enactment of the Employee
Retirement Income Security Act in 1974. This growth forced the Treasury
Department and the IRS to recognize that enforcement of laws governing
tax-exempt entities required vastly different tools and personnel than those
needed for enforcement of laws designed to assure collection of taxes from
individuals and business entities. The result has been vast improvement in
federal regulation, but a failure to address the dichotomy. The rationale for
proposals to create a new federal agency to regulate charities is that the IRS
can never be the appropriate vehicle for enforcing laws that do not involve
tax collection.
Regardless of the situs of federal regulation, there remains the basic
question of what if any regulatory role should be retained by the states.
One of the justifications for retaining state power is the proximity of state
attorneys general and state courts to the entities subject to regulation. This
may permit more appropriate applications of the law, particularly in cases
involving cy pres and deviation. Another advantage is the breadth of
sanctions available in state courts in the exercise of their equity powers,
sanctions that are, at all times, aimed at preserving charitable assets rather
than imposing taxes that diminish charitable assets. Proposals to confer
equity powers on the Tax Court signify that this may no longer be
considered a valid argument for preserving a state role. The Finance
Committee staff proposals for federal regulation of conversions and
solicitation confront us with the same questions.

2007]

NONPROFITACCOUNTABILITY

As a society, we have encouraged the creation and growth of nonprofit
charitable organizations on the grounds that they provide unique benefits to
the general public different in nature and purpose from those provided by
government or the private sector. In encouraging the growth of the
nonprofit sector, we have afforded great leeway to individuals to determine
the purposes to which their gifts will be applied and the manner in which
these purposes will be accomplished. We have said to charitable fiduciaries
that if you act in furtherance of any one or more of a broad range of
purposes sanctioned in the law by virtue of their being considered as
beneficial to society, if you do not benefit personally at the expense of the
charity, and if you are not reckless in the administration of its assets, we
will not attempt to second-guess the methods you choose to accomplish
those purposes nor apply sanctions, even if you do so in ways that the
government or the private sector considers inefficient or inappropriate.
Current reform efforts described herein are directed at assuring the
integrity of the sector. That is what we mean when we call for greater
accountability. As the recitation of the numerous initiatives demonstrates,
the tension is always between granting more freedom to fiduciaries to
determine how best to frame and then carry out the mission of the
organization they are entrusted to manage (e.g., immunity from liability),
and limiting that freedom by prescribing the forms in which they can be
organized and the manner in which they will operate (e.g., limiting the size
of boards and mandating governance structures).
-It is generally accepted that the strength of the nonprofit sector is
attributable in large part to the freedom afforded to charities and their
creators. But critics also point to this lack of regulation as the cause of
excesses that they believe can best be curtailed by limiting the freedom of
choice or demanding compliance with standards of efficiency or propriety.
Others argue that there is insufficient connection between the benefits given
to -charities and the value they give back to the public. They would require
a more immediate demonstration of public benefit from funds for which tax
deductions and exemptions are granted-whether by expanding the pay out
requirement now imposed on foundations to endowment funds held by
publicly supported charities or by limiting the life of charities. Still others
would require charities to demonstrate compliance with specific standards
that will permit measurement of the extent of their contribution to society.
If one believes that rigorous monitoring of charitable performance is
needed, then one must consider who can best do the monitoring. Some
commentators argue that only government can carry out this function.
Others believe it can be accomplished by requiring charities to justify their
status through expanded public disclosure requirements. Expansion of selfregulation is also under study. If government is doing the monitoring, it can
use sanctions to compel compliance. If it is the public, withholding
contributions and fees will be effective sanctions for charities that rely on
contributions from the public or from receipts for services they provide for
funding. It will not be so for foundations and public charities with
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endowments that make them virtually self-sufficient or for those that rely
solely on receipts for services. For these, self-regulation, with all its
limitations, may be the only answer. Underlying all analyses must be
consideration of the degree to which a measure of this sort will change the
basic nature of the sector and whether restricting its freedom will curtail its
ability to be innovative, to respond promptly to unforeseen needs, and to
operate without some of the bureaucratic constraints that are a concomitant
of governmental activity. This is undoubtedly the greatest challenge that
must be faced by those who want to preserve the sector.

